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Abstract
Eﬃcient investment in human capital is a subject of great concern among econ-omists.
By means of an overlapping-generations macrodynamic model with credit constraints,
imperfect insurance and exogenous labor supply, we appraise ineﬃciencies related to
misinvestment in human capital and propose a simple scheme of redistributive taxation
to mitigate them. A numerical simulation is calibrated in order to match stylized facts
of the quite unequal Brazilian economy and shows that, in steady-state, with a ﬂat-tax
mechanism and lump-sum transfers, government intervention is beneﬁcial to the extent
it maximizes our utilitarian measure of welfare and reduces both ineﬃciency associated
with misdirected investment in human capital and standard inequality indexes. After
considering the possibility of decomposing our utilitarian measure of welfare and of
allowing for public debt, we show that reduced inequality is the driving force which
accounts for welfare improvement and that public debt plays no role. Robustness analysis
shows that endogenizing labor supply does not lead to substantial changes in previous
results.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Charles Dickens, the famous and skillful 19th century English writer, living in an impover-
ished family, was sent to work at the age of twelve in 1824 and prevented from attending
a school for about one year. Judging by the outstanding quality of his published works as
a writer, and despite the well documented fact that much of a person’s cognitive ability is
developed early in life (Heckman, 1999), Dickens’ productivity in his later craft was not af-
fected by such short fate of his. But low-income people frequently do not have the means for
providing an adequate intellectual support for their children, and, given a poor assistance
by the public sector in many developing countries nowadays (World Bank, 2004), a large
fraction of the latter, including the ablest ones, surely become unskilled workers when they
grow up. Especially in the age of a skill-biased technology, it is crucial to eﬃciently provide
the means for a proper intellectual development for each one in its due time.
The purpose of this paper is to assess, in a macrodynamic framework, the possible sources
of ineﬃciency in the investment in human capital of people early in life and to investigate
to what extent there is a role for redistributive public policies. In particular, we argue,
following Aiyagari, Greenwood and Seshadri (2002), that the equilibrium of a decentralized
economy is not eﬃcient: much of the investment in human capital is misdirected in spite of
an overinvestment phenomenon. But, extending the model so as to allow for a public sector,
we show that a simple scheme of uniform taxation mitigates the problem by the choice of
an appropriate level of the tax rate. Moreover, decomposing the utilitarian welfare gains in
three components (gains from reduced inequality, lower uncertainty and increasing levels of
consumption), we ﬁnd that reduced inequality explains the most of welfare improvement.
The majority of related theoretical studies are built on the pathbreaking works by Gary
S. Becker and Theodore W. Schultz in the 1960s. Their analysis has drawn our attention to
an important type of investment that was being overlooked then: investment in the human
capital of people.1 Such idea is construed as investment of resources (physical or monetary) in
one’s productive capacity, and is often identiﬁed with the concept of education itself. Surely,
it has intrinsic characteristics diverse from the ones associated with investment in physical
capital. Particularly, it is frequently argued that human capital is not a good collateral
for loans, implying that, for example, a father is not seldom borrowing constrained when
investing in the human capital of his children.
1See Lewis (1988) for a slightly diﬀerent historical claim about the origins of the human capital concept.
2Recent research has investigated to what degree the presence of credit constraints, en-
dogenous or exogenous, aﬀects the equilibrium allocation in a decentralized system and,
depending upon the degree of ineﬃciency achieved, whether there is any role for govern-
ment intervention. A similar line of reasoning is followed, for example, by Lochner and
Monge-Naranjo (2003) and Hanushek, Leung and Yilmaz (2002).2
The former work has constructed a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping-generations
model with one-sided altruism. In this environment, agents have the choice of investing
in their own human capital, and the more they invest, the higher are their labor earnings.
When credit constraints are not present, the equilibrium allocation in complete markets will
be eﬃcient provided every individual is fully committed to repay his debts. On the other
hand, the presence of endogenous or exogenousb o r r o w i n gc o n s t r a i n t sm a k e si n v e s t m e n ti n
human capital to depend on the agent’s total wealth, and not only on his ability. Therefore,
this fact gives rise to misinvestment, in the sense that many people who receive investment
in their human capital do not deserve it most. Numerical simulations in a framework with
endogenous credit constraints are parametrized in order to replicate key features of US data
and evaluate the steady-state impacts mainly in terms of welfare of changes in government
policies as educational subsidies and bankruptcy policy.
Hanushek, Leung and Yilmaz’s (2002) basic framework diﬀers from Lochner and Monge-
Naranjo’s in the number of periods a typical agent lives and in the kind of borrowing con-
straints considered: the latter are mainly concerned with endogenous credit constraints,
whereas the former assume an environment with exogenous credit constraints. Hanushek,
Leung and Yilmaz’s analysis evaluates the steady-state impact on several variables - e.g.,
welfare, number of agents constrained and college successfulness - of competing government
policies as education subsidies and income-contingent loans. One important point is empha-
sized at the same time: the need for a complete general equilibrium set-up to fully appraise
the economic impacts of public policies aimed at fostering human capital accumulation.
Although several studies, chieﬂy on the micro level, still rely on a partial equilibrium frame-
work, some macrodynamic models like the preceding ones provide an approach which seems
to be much more general and its premises are more realistic.
The approach developed here contains elements from both previously quoted papers:
exogenous credit constraints and general equilibrium analysis. As it has been already stated,
2In fact, many studies have endeavored in a macrodynamic analysis of investment in human capital with
market imperfections. Loury (1981) and Laitner (1992) are well-known early examples.
3we modify the basic set-up of the Aiyagari, Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) - hereafter
AGS - framework to answer this simple question: is there any role for public policies in
a simple macrodynamic overlapping-generations model with investment in human capital,
heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets?
This is indeed an important question not only in the previously quoted models but also
in the AGS framework, which has a distinguishing feature: overaccumulation of human and
physical capital. When individuals are subject to idiosyncratic shocks - for example, to
changing ability levels - in an incomplete markets world (that is, with liquidity constraints
and absence of perfect insurance) they overaccumulate capital to create a buﬀer of assets
against negative income shocks in future. Such fact leads to an aggregate level of capital
higher than what would be otherwise eﬃcient and, hence, the equilibrium interest rate is
lower than the one implied by time preference. Aiyagari (1995) has shown that, in such
environment, it is generally true that the optimal long-run level of capital income taxation
is strictly positive. By means of numerical simulations, calibrated to match some features
of the Brazilian economy, we show this is true as well for our model when we consider only
labor income taxation.
In a framework without human capital, a few studies (e.g., Aiyagari and McGrattan
(1998), Flod´ en (2001) and Flod´ en and Lind´ e (2001)) have applied this idea to evaluate the
optimal size of government debt to GDP level and transfers. Initially, we simply suppose
there is no public debt at all and allow for a labor income taxation, but we extend the analysis
by taking into account investment in human capital and showing that standard inequality
statistics for income and wealth are improved when government imposes an optimal welfare
improving tax rate level. Indeed, the link among market imperfections, investment in human
capital and inequalities is a topic of much concern in Brazil, at least since the 1970s with an
ensuing debate spurred by Carlos Langoni, for whom Brazilian measures of income inequality
worsened due to increasing asymmetries in educational level of the population (Langoni,
1973). In fact, we show that this problem can be mitigated somewhat with government
intervention, especially with respect to the Gini index and the correlation of labor income
across generations.
T h et a x a t i o ns c h e m ew es u g g e s ti sc l o s e l yr e l a t e dt ot h el i t e r a t u r eo nr e d i s t r i b u t i v e
taxation (Eaton and Rosen (1980), Varian (1980), among others), which argues that, when
individuals are heterogenous with respect to their labor income as in the set-up we develop in
this paper, a proportional earnings tax acts as social insurance by improving risk sharing in
4the economy. Indeed, if the government keeps a balanced budget each period with lump-sum
transfers, a redistributive eﬀect takes place, because the disposable income of poor agents
is increased, whereas an opposite eﬀect occurs with the rich. Moreover, if the objective
function of the typical agent is increasing and concave in income, he is clearly better oﬀ with
such redistributive mechanism.
At the same time, it has been noticed that public debt is to some degree beneﬁcial in
liquidity constrained economies, since it increases the liquidity level (Woodford, 1990). Even
though our main concern is with taxation, this last claim is also assessed in this paper by
allowing public sector not only to levy taxes, but to accumulate debt. The results on debt are
that the coeﬃcient variation of total consumption is increased and overall welfare is lower,
contrary to what was expected.
I no r d e rt oc o m p l e t e l yg a u g et h ep r e d i c t i v ep o w e ro ft h em o d e l ,w ea s kt h ef o l l o w i n g
question: Can the theoretical structure generate Brazilian-like statistics if we preserve the
parameterization for the US economy provided by AGS but introduce governmental distor-
tions? To this end, we suppose government undertakes very distortional public policies in
the sense of transferring resources from society to top 10% richer individuals. Even though
the results suggest inequality statistics do not exactly ﬁt Brazilian data, the model explains
a little the unequal environment.
We proceed as follows. In the next section the basic framework is presented carefully and
extended to include a public sector through uniform taxation and lump-sum transfers. Next
(section 3), we calibrate the model and simulate it both with and without government. The
main results are surveyed in section 4, jointly with a discussion of what has been learnt and
the limitations of our approach. Section 5 provides further thoughts on welfare decomposition
and evaluates previous results on welfare under this perspective. In section 6 we extend the
set-up so as to allow for public debt. In section 7 we consider a modiﬁed framework with
endogenous labor supply and show the new results. Section 8 carries out an appraisal of the
predictive power of the model by looking at other way round as we mentioned in the previous
paragraph. The conclusion sets forth some ideas for further research and summarizes the
ﬁndings up to this point.
52 Framework
The AGS model builds on a general set-up originally conceived by S. Rao Aiyagari (Aiyagari
and Greenwood, undated). Aiyagari’s idea intended to explain the mechanics of human
capital investment in a world with borrowing constraints and imperfect insurance. His
ﬁrst step was to characterize the eﬃcient allocation without mentioning preferences, only
describing the economy’s basic structure. This is also the approach in AGS, which we follow
in this paper.
Simply put, the economy’s structure is a standard overlapping-generations model with
one-sided altruism where agents live for three periods. Each person lives as a child, a young
adult (y) and an old adult (o). At each point in time, the three generations are living
together and the mass of young and old agents is each one normalized to 1.
Choice set-up is as follows. When a child, an agent does not make any choice: he is
merely apt to receive investment in his human capital. There are two channels to increase
the human capital of a child: direct investment of physical resources, labeled m, and spending
labor resources in child-care, n.I n v e s t m e n tv i am implies in a ﬁxed cost φ. We assume the
existence of a competitive market for providing child-care resources.3 A young individual’s
choices are standard: how much to consume, to save and to invest (if any investment is made
at all) in his oﬀspring. Lastly, an old agent chooses his level of consumption and bequests
to be inherited by his son.
There is only one good in this economy (o), whose production obeys a neoclassical pro-
duction function: o = O(k,l), where k is the aggregate level of capital and l represents total
labor supply in eﬃcient units, O is strictly increasing in its arguments and strictly concave.
A young agent’s labor supply is between goods production and child-care, that is, every
person chooses whether to be a “hard” worker or a “baby-sitter”. The total amount of
eﬃcient units of labor oﬀered by the young (π) is a predetermined variable in the following
sense: π = H(a−1,m −1,n −1), where a stands for the young’s ability and the subscript in a−1
reﬂects the fact that the son’s ability is known to his father.4 If π0 stands for productivity
3AGS, in the last section of the their paper, investigate whether the absence of such market implies any
kind of ineﬃciency. They conclude it does so, but we will not replicate this experiment here: we assume
there is not a problem of lack of child-care facilities in our world.
4See Levhari and Weiss (1974) for an early use of a similar assumption about investment in human capital,
ability and future labor income.
6next period, the function H is said to satisfy: (i) H(a,0,0) = a ≤ π0; (ii) H(a,m,0) =
H(a,0,n)=a; (iii) Hi > 0, i =1 ,2,3; (iv) H12, H13 and H23 > 0; (v) H is strictly concave
in its arguments, jointly and separately. It is also assumed that an agent with productivity π
and ability a−1 working in the child-care sector supplies in eﬃcient units only a−1 whatever
is his actual productivity level. This, jointly with (i), implies the existence of comparative
advantage for skilled agents (m,n > 0) over unskilled (n and/or m =0 )o nw o r k i n gi nt h e
production of goods.
I nt h i se c o n o m y ,i tm u s tb en o t i c e dt h a ta g e n ts are heterogenous at least in one sense:
they do not have the same level of ability. To this kind of heterogeneity it is given a well-
behaved dynamic structure: we assume that (at)t follows a stationary Markov process with
transition function A1(a|a−1).
Finally, capital accumulation and resources constraints are given, respectively, by k0 =
(1−δ)k+i and c+m+i = o.H e r e ,δ is the geometric depreciation rate, assumed constant; c
and i stand as usual for aggregate consumption and physical investment; m is the aggregate
level of investment in human capital through m, and takes into account the ﬁxed cost φ.
2.1 Eﬃcient Allocation
How does an eﬃcient allocation look like in this environment? Possible sources of ineﬃciency
are certainly the idiosyncratic shocks, against which every agent would like to insure himself,
and liquidity constraints, in the sense of non-negative bequests and total wealth. In complete
markets, these problems are ruled out by deﬁnition, and we assume they are for a moment.
Each young parent derives utility from present (cy) and future consumption (co0), and
also from his son’s lifetime expected utility (V 0). Thus, his objective function is: U(cy)+
βE[U(co0)+θV 0], where U is strictly increasing and strictly concave, U1(0) = ∞, β ∈ (0,1)
is a intertemporal discount factor and θ ∈ (0,1] represents the degree of altruism towards
his son. The dynamic programming problem facing a young agent living in a world with
complete markets is:






































1, if π0 >a
0, otherwise
, s(a0|a)i sc o n t i n g e n tc l a i mt ot h ea m o u n ts in case of
occurring state a0 next period given the current ability state a, q(a0|a) represents its price, b
is the bequest received by the old from his parent, and b0 denotes the amount of resources
(or debts) the old leaves to his son.
If we assume an actuarially fair price for the contingent claims, q(a0|a)= A1
1+r,a n d
a perfect-pooled steady-state (Lucas, 1982)5,t h e nﬁrst-order necessary conditions, jointly
with Benveniste-Scheinkman and envelope theorems, imply (AGS, p.299-301):





y)=( 1 + r)βU1(c
o0)( 2 )
1+r = wH2(a,m,n), when m>0( 3 )
1+r = H3(a,m,n), when n>0( 4 )
wn+ m + φ<
w[H(a,m,n) − a]
1+r
,f o rm,n > 0( 5 )
wn+ m + φ ≥
w[H(a,m,n) − a]
1+r
,f o rm,n =0 . ( 6 )
When θ = 1 (pure altruism), equation (1) yields 1 + r = 1
β, the standard result for the
neoclassical growth model; (2) is a usual Euler equation for a simple two-period economy. (3)
and (4) stand for the non-arbitrage conditions which an equilibrium allocation must obey.
The derivation of equations (5) and (6) are not straightforward (AGS, p. 301), but their
economic interpretation is very simple. Initially notice that a typical agent in our economy
5Every young and every old individual consume the same amount: cy and co0
respectively.
8will invest in the human capital of his children only if m and n are both strictly greater
than zero: it will never be the case of m =0a n dn>0, or n =0a n dm>0. This occurs
because, for example, H(a,0,n)=a = H(a,0,0): since the same outcome in terms of future
productivity of the oﬀspring would be achieved if no investment is made at all, to make
no investment will aﬀord the father to consume more presently. But when are m,n > 0?
Investment in children occurs only if current costs of becoming skilled (wn + m + φ) falls
below the present value of the skill-premium (
w[H(a,m,n)−a]
1+r ). As long as there are two forms
to invest in the human capital of the oﬀspring to enhance their skills, an eﬃciency condition
always holds in this case:
wH2(a,m,n)=H3(a,m,n). (7)
There is a distinguishing feature displayed by the eﬃcient allocation: (5) and (6) imply
decision rules M(a)a n dN(a)a sw e l la sat h r e s h o l d ,a∗, for the level of ability such that
M(a),N(a) > 0i fa>a ∗ and M(a),N(a) = 0 otherwise. As we shall stress below (sections
2.2 and 4), this condition is not necessarily valid in an incomplete markets environment,
giving rise to misinvestment.
An eﬃcient allocation in a stationary equilibrium is therefore described by equations (1)
to (6), standard proﬁt maximization conditions for a competitive ﬁrm,
r + δ = O1(k,l)( 8 )

















[M(a)+φ]dA(a) ≤ O(k,l), (12)
where S = {a : H(a,M(a),N(a)) >a } is the set of skilled agents in steady-state, U = S c and
A(a) is the stationary distribution associated with the Markov process for ability. Condition
(10) is the labor supply for goods production and (11) represents market-clearing in chid-








S N(a)dA(a), since N(a)=0f o ra l la ∈ U (an analogous property holds
for M(a)).
We end the discussion of the eﬃcient allocation with two observations:
1. Only unskilled agents will work in the child-care sector: no skilled individual will
rationally reject the skill premium his father’s choice imparts him. But it is not true
to say that only skilled agents work in the goods production sector: (11) does not
necessarily binds.
2. With pure altruism, which will be the case considered for numerical simulations later
on, 1+r = 1
β holds. Since AGS framework has the ﬂavor of Aiyagari’s 1994 inﬂuential
paper, it seems that in incomplete markets we shall have an interest rate below the
one implied by time preference as far as overaccumulation of capital is also present.
2.2 Incomplete Markets Structure with Government
Suppose now that bequests are required to be non-negative and there is no private insurance
market, so that we have an incomplete markets structure. Moreover, there is a government
which taxes young people’s income uniformly by a tax rate τ ≥ 0 and returns them the
proceeds via identical lump-sum transfers (χ). In this setting with a time-invariant govern-
ment policy rule and assuming a stationary environment, the dynamic programming problem
facing a young agent is:
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= s + b.
A recursive stationary competitive equilibrium is deﬁned by:
(i) Decision rules for s,m,n and b, respectively s = S(π,a,b), m = M(π,a,b), n =
N(π,a,b)a n db0 = B(π0,a 0,s+ b), such that, given r, w, χ and τ, they solve (CP2).























where Ty and To stand for transition functions induced by A(a0|a) and decision rules
in (i).






and l = E(π) − E(n).





AGS show that, when government is not present (τ = 0), the equilibrium in the incom-
plete markets world is such that there is overinvestment in human capital of children, which
is misdirected, in the sense that a fraction of low-ability agents become skilled whereas there
is also a non-null mass of high-ability agents unskilled. Overaccumulation of physical capital
also emerges because of the idiosyncratic shocks and the absence of perfect insurance: in this
context, the agent accumulates more assets than it would be optimal in complete markets to
make a buﬀer so as to (imperfectly) insure himself against negative shocks. This fact drives
interest rate down to a level below 1
β −1. The investment in human capital is misdirected due
to credit constraints: no father is allowed to desave more than |b| or leave negative bequests.
Also notice that, now, m and n are functions not only of a but also of π and b:p o o ra g e n t s
with high-ability children will not invest enough in their oﬀspring since they lack resources
to do so.
2.3 Taxation and Welfare
Now we pose three questions: What features does a recursive stationary competitive equilib-
rium display when τ>0? Is there any “optimal” (in the sense of maximizing a given measure
of social welfare) level τ∗ > 0 which helps to alleviate the ineﬃciency associated with the
incomplete markets structure? Can government intervention, when comparing steady-states,
be beneﬁcial to individuals?
11Our measure of welfare, as it is usual in literature, will be the compensating variation in
consumption.6 Suppose that government intervention is indeed beneﬁcial in terms of welfare
and let λ ≥ 0 be the constant fraction of consumption arising in incomplete markets when
τ = 0 that equalizes agents mean utility in this world and its expected utility when τ>0



















t+1)t is a (possibly uncertain) consumption sequence which solves consumer’s
i problem in incomplete markets with τ =0 ,a n dF is the distribution function of agents
at t = 0. Without loss of generality, we may suppose that F simply corresponds to the
invariant distribution Dy a n dt h a te a c ha g e n ti si n d e x e db yi ∈ Ω ⊂ R (Ω is not necessarily
a countable or denumerable set) in the place of its state-vector when young, (π,a,b). With

















Notice that, the higher is λ,f o rag i v e nτ>0, the stronger will be an agent’s willingness
to live in an incomplete markets world with government instead of an incomplete markets
world without a public sector. If we set U(c)=c1−µ−1













O u re x p e r i m e n tt oa n s w e rt h ea b o v eq u e stions consists in making a search in τ ∈ [0,1]
to check whether we can pick some τ∗ such that λ(τ∗) ≥ λ(τ), ∀τ ∈ [0,1], which would
maximize our welfare criterion. Since the problem described in (CP2) does not have a closed-
form solution, we simulate it for a given set of parameters properly chosen in order to match
some features of Brazilian data. The calibration and simulation procedures undertaken are
described in the next section.
6See Imrohoroglu (1989) for an early use of such measure in a macrodynamic model with heterogenous
agents.
7Appendix B.
123 Calibration and Simulation Procedures
T i m eu n i t yw a ss e tt o2 0y e a r s ,a n dU(c)=c1−µ−1
1−µ .W e p i c k µ = 2, which is contained
in the interval analyzed in Cunha and Ferreira (2003) for Brazil, and βyear =0 .88 = β
1
20
was selected so that incomplete markets economy without government has an equilibrium
interest rate near 9% observed in Brazil. Only the case of pure altruism is considered: θ =1 .
The production function has the speciﬁcation as AGS for the US economy, except for a
lower TFP: o = O(k,l)=zkνl1−ν,w h e r ez =0 .7a n dν =0 .36. Capital depreciates at a
rate of 6.5% each year (Val and Ferreira, 2001), implying δ =1− (1 − 0.065)20 ∼ = 0.74.8
The stochastic process driving ability satisﬁes loga0 = ι(1 − ω)+ωloga + σ
√
1 − ω2ζ,
ζ ∼ N(0,1). After Tauchen (1986) we know this process is amenable to an approximation
by a discrete Markov process, which will be useful in simulations. Productivity function
is H(a,m,n)=ηaχ[ξnε +( 1− ξ)mε]
ρ
ε + a, ε ≤ 1, as in AGS.9 The ﬁxed cost associated
with m is arbitrarily selected: φ =0 .01. ι, ω, σ, χ, η,ξ, ε and ρ are chosen so that the
incomplete markets economy with τ = 0 replicates income Gini index in Brazil (0.6). Table
1 summarizes the model’s calibration.
Remark 1 Certainly the above parameterization does not support any exhaustive matching
of the Brazilian economy. In this being the case, we claim that our economy may be construed
as a rough approximation to a quite unequal (with respect to income distribution) society, as
the targeted income Gini suggests. Furthermore, it may also be interpreted as a developing
economy, since it displays a lower TFP vis-` a-vis United States and a higher interest rate.
Given its characterization in section 2.1, it is not a diﬃcult task to ﬁnd the equilibrium
allocation in complete markets numerically relatively to the problem (CP2). To handle the
incomplete markets dynamic programming problem, several methods are available nowa-
days.10,11 Despite the large number of state variables in our problem - they are indeed four:
8We are aware of Cooley’s (1997) advises regarding calibrating a model by referring to prior studies.
On the other hand, given that macroeconomic models with heterogenous agents represent a recent area of
research in Brazil, we consider it is still fair to proceed as we did.
9This speciﬁcation does not satisfy H(a,m,0) = H(a,0,n)=a. But it is easily checked that, in equilib-
rium, given the eﬃcient allocation condition (7) that holds both in complete and incomplete markets, it will
never be the case that m>0a n dn =0 ,o rn>0a n dm =0 .
10See Marimon and Scott (1999) for an introductory presentation of most of them, and Rust (1996) for a
survey.
11The basic computation of consumer’s problem is based on a C++ code written for the AGS original
13π,a,b and s + b -, the state-space discretization approach worked well. We construct grids
for the state variables and solve the agent’s problem for points inside them. The discrete
dynamic programming is:




































minm,n{m + φ + wn : π0 = H(a,m,n)}
0
,i fπ0 >a
,i fπ0 = a
.
The discrete sets above have some properties, which we list:
1. Ability a ∈ A = {a1,...,a 15}.
2. Productivity π ∈ P = {π1,...,π100},a n dP satisﬁes W ∪A ⊂ P,w h e r eW stands for
the set of productivities arising in eﬃcient markets.
3. v = s + b ∈ ¯ S = {v1,...,v 125}.
4. Bequest b ∈ B = {b1,...,b 125}.
To solve the consumer’s problem, we want to ﬁnd simultaneously two ﬁxed points, one for
each value function. As long as one value function depends on the order, we proceed as AGS
suggest, given wage, interest rate, tax rate and lump-sum transfer: 1st) Enter an initial guess
for V ,d e n o t e dV j, and solve (20) for J, represented by Jj;2 nd)G i v e nJj compute a revised
guess, V j+1,f o rV solving (19); 3rd) Repeat the process until convergence is obtained in V
and J. Although the consumer’s problem loop is easily solved this way, it remains to ﬁnd
the equilibrium r, w and χ. This is accomplished by initial guesses for them and, given (8)
to (10) and (13) to (15), subsequent updates of their values after each consumer’s problem
loop. Lastly, we ﬁnd the invariant distributions deﬁned in equations (13) and (14). To do
framework by its authors, and we are indebted to them. However, any misuse or misinterpretation of their
code is ours.
14this, we use Monte Carlo simulation, which is a powerful instrument to compute invariant
distributions in stochastic dynamic programming problems.12
4 Results
4.1 Incomplete Markets without Government
Interest rate and income Gini index found by the simulations are 7% and 0.61 respectively
in incomplete markets, numbers very close to Brazilian data. Although income Gini index
generated by the model is indeed near empirical estimates for family per capita income Gini
index, 0.6 in 1999 (see Menezes-Filho, 2001), the interest rate is rather on the low side. A
group of extra simulations was unsuccessfully run to overcome this result: even after giving
up to calibrate β to match both r and Investment
GDP as AGS do, the model does not generate a
more plausible interest rate to Brazilian data if annual time discount factor were not set to
very low - and irrealistic - levels.
As it is well documented in AGS, the number of skilled agents increases with incomplete
markets due to an overinvestment phenomenon: here they represent 60% in complete and
76% in incomplete markets. The eﬃcient allocation is characterized by a cut-oﬀ rule for
ability, a∗ =2 .25, such that everyone with a lower level of ability (a ≤ a∗)d o e sn o tb e c o m e
skilled. In incomplete markets, 50% of agents with a ≤ 2.25 receive positive amounts of
investment in human capital, suggesting that a large fraction of such investment is misdi-
rected. Total physical capital stock is 470% higher in incomplete markets, characterizing
overaccumulation. Investment in human capital stock measured by m rises 35% in incom-
plete markets, and investment in child-care (wn) increases at the same time by 50%.
Labor earnings (wπ) have a Gini index of 0.64, which is the same for productivity as long
as they diﬀer only up to a multiplicative factor. 65% of total wealth (s + b)i sm a d eu po f
intergenerational transfers (b).13 The intergenerational correlation of long-run labor income
is 0.79 in incomplete markets (17% higher than in eﬃcient steady-state), which is barely in
line with empirical evidence in Brazil according to Andrade et al. (2003), whose estimate
12Geweke (1996) discusses the main aspects of Monte Carlo simulation and its applications.
13Figures 1 and 2 plot invariant distributions for π and s + b.
15is 0.6.14,15 We also notice that 76% of agents are constrained (in the sense b =0 )i no u r
incomplete markets world: Issler and Rocha (2000) report that 74% of adult population in
Brazil are also constrained. Table 2 summarizes inequality data for income and also presents
the ratio of income appropriated by the top and bottom 20%: for the last twenty years in
Brazil (PNAD data), we ﬁnd 27.4 as mean, and the incomplete markets economy suggests
27.1.
4.2 Incomplete Markets with Government
Having portrayed incomplete markets ineﬃcient structure, it remains to answer the question
we posed before: is there any role for public policies? If we were to compare the mean
utility derived from the eﬃcient complete markets structure with the mean utility level from
incomplete markets, we would be tempted to say that an agent prefers to live in the last
world: steady-state utility is higher with incomplete markets due mainly to the excessive
level of aggregate capital there. If this line of reasoning were correct, evidently there will
not be any role for a public sector: agents are better oﬀ in a decentralized market economy
with imperfect insurance and liquidity constraints.
Fortunately, AGS suggest us to do the following experiment. Suppose that, starting from
incomplete markets, the eﬃcient equilibrium allocation is suddenly implemented. Taking
into account the transition path from incomplete to complete markets, does an agent still
prefer to live in an incomplete markets world? Our task is to compute a T-period transition























t=T+1 stands for an eﬃcient allocation. From (21) and utility parametriza-
tion presented above (section 2.3), it is easily checked that λtr is given by the following
14For the US economy, Solon (1992) found a correlation of 0.4 or even higher for labor earnings, but lower
than 0.6.
15Every autocorrelation described in this paper was taken, as it is usual in the literature, with respect to


























We have found from (22) and simulation λtr = −0.72.16 Then a typical individual will
b ew i l l i n gt op a y7 2 %o fh i sc o n s u m p t i o ni na ni n c o m p l e t em a r k e t sw o r l di no r d e rt ol i v ei n
an eﬃcient one (including the transition path). The intuition for this result is simple: the
aggregate level of consumption has a boom as the economy’s stock of physical capital runs
down, aﬀording each one a higher level of utility earlier, which has a greater impact on the
summation in (21). Figure 3 plots the transitionp a t hf o rc o n s u m p t i o na n dp h y s i c a lc a p i t a l .
B u tw h a tc a nb es a i da b o u tg o v e r n m e n t ’ sr o l e ?T oﬁnd an optimal design for public poli-
cies would be a fairly complicated exercise, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, if we were to take
into account only steady-state welfare, the problem is not well-deﬁned: steady-state utility
is higher in incomplete markets than in an eﬃcient complete markets structure. Secondly,
to allow for a dynamic problem will require us to depart from the standard microeconomic
approaches like De Fraja (2002) and his critics, who consider only stationary distributions.
Therefore, we follow Aiyagari’s (1995) suggestion and other studies thereafter to promote a
steady-state analysis, thereby investigating whether a uniform income taxation scheme alle-
viates incomplete markets’ distortions and increases the agent’s welfare, which is measured
by compensating variation in consumption (section 2.3).
After simulating an incomplete market economy with government for tax rate levels
ranging from τ =0t oτ = 1, we found, following (16) and (18), λ(τ)t ob eac o n c a v e
function that is maximized at τ∗ =5 2 % ,a n dλ(τ∗) = 100% (see ﬁgure 4). Therefore, an
individual would prefer to live in an incomplete markets economy where there is a public
sector taxing his labor income in 52% and returning the proceeds via lump-sum transfers
rather than in an incomplete markets structure with no government at all (τ =0 ) .
As we hinted before, not only an agent will be willing to live in such world, but also the
problems associated with misinvestment and inequality are mitigated when we set τ = τ∗.
Interest rate rises from 7% to 8%, reﬂecting a stock of physical capital 35% lower.17 Income
Gini index decreases to 0.53, and wealth Gini is now 0.38, nearly half its previous value
16AGS perform a similar exercise and ﬁnd λtr = −0.63 in their parametrized economy, suggesting that
our value is not too high.
17See ﬁgure 7.
17(0.64). Correlation of total income decreases from 0.9t o0 .83.18 Now, the ratio of income
appropriated by the top and bottom 20% is 16, 40% lower. Concerning the eﬃciency of
the allocation achieved, now we have only 5% with a ≤ a∗ becoming skilled, contrasting
with 50% when τ =0 . 19 Thus the government’s intervention ameliorates to some extent the
ineﬃciency associated with incomplete markets, and, at the same time, is welfare-improving
according to our criterion.20
The economic intuition for the previous results is quite simple. Firstly, notice that
the proposed taxation scheme penalizes richer agents, by reducing their disposable income,
whereas it gives a “bliss” to poorer ones. For a rich individual the net eﬀect of taxation and
lump-sum transfers is negative, that is, χ − τwπrich < 0. On the other hand, poor agents
have an opposite net eﬀect: χ−τwπpoor > 0. Now, a typical agent spends a lower fraction of
his lifetime in an unfavorable situation, aﬀording him a greater utility.21 The distinct aspect
of this redistributive mechanism of making some agents less rich an other less poor has to
do with the format of the steady-state utility, our value function V .S i n c e V is steeper in
the low-end, poor individuals’ “marginal utility” is greater than rich’s. Therefore, given the
skewed distribution of labor income, the net eﬀect of our taxation mechanism in terms of
utility for a “mean agent” will be positive.
Secondly, regarding the positive outcomes in terms of eﬃciency, notice that, as long as rich
people accumulate relatively more assets - policy functions for b and s are increasing in wπ
-, to reduce their disposable income is equivalent to prevent them of accumulating too much.
Thus, the interest rate is raised, lowering the costs of the precautionary savings for everyone
and increasing their eﬀectiveness in smoothing consumption. At the same time, government
provides an additional insurance to individuals, χ, improving consumption smoothing: the
coeﬃcient of variation of total consumption is 50% lower when τ = 52%.
Lastly, with respect to eﬃcient investment in children, note that the taxation scheme
is more onerous for the rich, who are keen to invest in the human capital of their oﬀspring
whatever their ability levels. Top 50% richer individuals in terms of labor income invest 280%
18See ﬁgure 6.
19Unfortunately, this scheme also has perverse eﬀects. When τ = 0, 90% of the agents with ability level
above a∗ become skilled. Now, with τ =0 .52, only 85%, illustrating an obvious limitation in terms of
eﬃciency of the proposed mechanism. Furthermore, the fraction of constrained agents increases from 76%
to 88%.
20See table 3 for a summary of most statistics presented in this section.
21See ﬁgure 5.
18more in children relatively to the bottom 50% in incomplete markets without government.
When τ =0 .52, the former invest “only” 100% more. Consequently, lowering disposable
income of the rich, we prevent them to misinvest too much, and eﬃciency in the allocation
of resources is increased to some degree.
5 Welfare Decomposition
Up to this point in our analysis, we have accomplished the following tasks: (i) We have shown
that a simple scheme of labor income taxation in a steady-state analysis with incomplete
markets can mitigate the ineﬃciency in this economy; (ii) Taking into account a utilitarian
welfare measure (λ), there is one level of tax rate that maximizes our criterion. Particularly,
it was shown there are both a reduced-inequality eﬀect (via income redistribution) and a
reduced-uncertainty eﬀect (in the sense of a lower variability in consumption). The latter
welfare criterion encompasses all them together.
But one may say, following Fl´ oden (2001), whose analysis is inspired by B´ enabou (2002),
that it is valid to try to decompose this measure in order to assess each eﬀect separately. To
do so, we show that, under a simple assumption about how an agent weights consumption
in youth (cy) and old age (co0) - see below -, the measure λ can be decomposed in three
components: the previously mentioned (uncertainty, λunc, and inequality, λine) and a level
eﬀect (λlev):
(1 + λ)=( 1+λunc)(1 + λine)(1 + λlev).
To motivate the decomposition, some deﬁnitions are in order.
Deﬁnition 1 The expected lifetime utility of an individual born at time −1 and indexed




















t=0 is a (possibly
uncertain at t =0 ) stream of consumption that solves agent i’s problem as in (CP2).
It is straightforward to deﬁne a utilitarian social welfare function:
19Deﬁnition 2 The utilitarian social welfare function in our framework is
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with F being again the distribution function of agents at t =0 .
In section 4, we endeavored a steady-state analysis so as to evaluate welfare gains of
changing from a policy A (τ =0 )t oB (τ>0). The utilitarian welfare gain criterion, λ,o f
changing from a benchmark economy (policy A) to an economy where other public policy is
present (B)i sn o wd e ﬁned more rigorously:

















Note that, as before in section 2.3, an average agent will be more willing to live in a
world with policy B for (positive and) higher values of λ.T h e n e x t t w o d e ﬁnitions are
rather technical and they have a microeconomic ﬂavor.
Deﬁnition 4 A certainty-equivalent consumption bundle for agent i is a period-invariant
deterministic sequence, {¯ c(i)y,¯ c(i)o}∞
t=0 = {¯ c(i),¯ c(i)}
∞











. That is, it represents a non-stochastic stream of consumption that
gives the agent i the same level of expected utility - “expected for i” - as of (CP2).
Remark 2 Here our analysis departs from Flod´ en (2001). He considers a univariate stream









number), one also ﬁnds a unique ¯ c(i) after a level of labor supply is ﬁxed in his model.
Now, we have a continuum of pairs (¯ c(i)y,,¯ c(i)o) satisfying our condition. By choosing
¯ c(i)y =¯ c(i)o =¯ c(i), we implicitly assume that each agent weights consumption in both
periods alike. But this assumption is also implicit in AGS (p.311) and here in Deﬁnition 3
above. Furthermore, assuming pure altruism (θ =1 ) and a mass of young and old both equal
to 1 makes such hypothesis less implausible.





















The following deﬁnitions are means of measuring separately the eﬀects of a change in
policy and they are similar to Flod´ en (2001, p.90-1):












































W ({¯ c(i),¯ c(i)}
∞
t=0)dF(i), (30)







Given the deﬁnitions above and the assumption about U in section 2.1, it is easily checked
that the costs of uncertainty are punc =1−
¯ C
C. The higher is aggregate certainty-equivalent
consumption vis-a-vis C, the lower are the costs associated with uncertainty. Notice that
the limiting case of a perfect consumption smoothing, we have simply ¯ C = C and the costs
of uncertainty are null. With respect to the costs of inequality, notice they are computed
from the distribution of certainty-equivalent consumption and that merely redistributing
consumption from a rich to a poor agent has no eﬀect on the expression of punc, but changes
the distribution of certainty-equivalent consumption. Thus, given the concavity of W,t h e
right-hand side of (30) increases and pine is reduced.
The third eﬀect has to do with changing levels of mean consumption and is deﬁned below.
21Deﬁnition 8 The welfare gain of increased levels of equilibrium consumption is
λlev =
CB
CA − 1. (32)
The following proposition suggests a simple way of decomposing λ:
Proposition 1 Assume u(cy,c o0)=U(cy)+βU(co0),w i t hU given as in section 2.1. Then
(1 + λ)=( 1+λunc)(1 + λine)(1 + λlev). (33)
Proof. Appendix C.
When we perform this decomposition to analyze the results of section 4, we notice that
the main eﬀect of our redistributive taxation policy is on reducing inequality (see ﬁgure
8). According to (33), at τ = τ∗ = 52% the contributions from reduced uncertainty, in-
equality and increasing levels of consumption to our measure of utilitarian welfare gains are
respectively −1%, 166% and −23%. Despite the fact that standard deviation of aggregate
consumption is reduced, the eﬀects on our measure of uncertainty is approximately null, that
is, λunc = −1%. Moreover, we observe that the measure of gains in terms of “pure economic
eﬃciency”, (1 + λunc)(1 + λlev), is maximized at a quite low level for τ:0 .7% (ﬁgure 9).23
Therefore, equity eﬀects apart, the taxation scheme proposed above is rather distortionary
in terms of eﬃciency.
5.1 Sensitivity
In decomposing utilitarian welfare above, we used a restrictive deﬁnition of certainty-equiva-
lent. Since the deﬁnition of the three eﬀects hinges on the fact that we give both young
and old the same deterministic consumption bundle, one may ask whether our results would
change if we deﬁne certainty-equivalent diﬀerently from Deﬁnition 4 and modify subsequent
deﬁnitions accordingly. To this end, we assume a young agent’s certainty-equivalent stands
23The component associated with “pure economic eﬃciency” is labeled after B´ enabou (2002) and puts
no value on equity eﬀects (λine). In a work analyzing the equity and eﬃciency eﬀects of redistributive
policies, Seshadri and Yuki (2003) emphasize this measure, which consists in comparing the aggregate level
of certainty-equivalent ( ¯ C).
22in a ﬁxed proportion to the certainty-equivalent of the old. That is, we take ¯ c(i)y and ¯ c(i)o
such that, for all i ∈ Ω,
¯ c(i)
y = α¯ c(i)a n d¯ c(i)
o =( 1− α)¯ c(i), (34)
where α =
E(cy)
















Some redeﬁnitions are in order.




The deﬁntion of the mean level of consumption does not change.
Deﬁnition 10 The cost of uncertainty is punc,a sd e ﬁned by



















W ({α¯ c(i),(1 − α)¯ c(i)}
∞
t=0)dF(i). (38)
Given the deﬁnitions above, we have the following proposition for decomposing λ:
Proposition 2 Suppose U(c) to be CRRA momentary utility function as deﬁned in section
3a n dl e tµ be its coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Then, under deﬁnitions 1 to 3, (34),
(29), (31), (32), and deﬁnitions 9 to 11, the utilitarian welfare gain of policy change (A to
B)a m o u n t st o :













When we perform this new decomposition, the utilitarian measure of welfare is again
maximized at τ =0 .52 and the driving force which accounts for welfare improvement is
reduced inequality. However, the welfare gains associated with reduced uncertainty are no
longer negative or negligible. Indeed, gains from less uncertainty are always increasing and
attain a maximum of 4%. Lastly, the gains associated with pure economic eﬃciency are now
maximized at a signiﬁcative tax rate: τ =2 % .
236 Public Debt
In order to allow for a “public sector cum debt” set-up, notice that the budget constraint of
government will no longer need to be balanced every period as in (15). Indeed, if xt stands
for total taxes revenue and dt i st h ea m o u n to fd e b ti np e r i o dt,t h eg o v e r n m e n tb u d g e t
equation is given now by
dt+1 =( 1+r)(dt + χ − xt), (40)
where χ is the lump-sum transfer as before. (40) simply states that, given an initial level of
public debt, d0,t h ev a l u eo fd e b tn e x tp e r i o di st h es u mo fi t sn e te x p e n s e st o d a y .
Following Flod´ en (2001) we examine only the choice of the average level of debt. Then,








A recursive stationary competitive equilibrium is deﬁned analogously to section 2.2, except
for the fact that now government holds both τ and ¯ d ﬁxed, and the consumer takes them as













Our illustrative experiment consisted in varying
¯ d
GDP over the interval [0.005 0.3] for our
benchmark economy with “optimal” redistributive taxation (τ =0 .52). We follow the same
procedures of simulation as described in section 3, except for the new deﬁnitions (41) and
(42).
The utilitarian welfare measure in this case decreases, implying that an agent would pre-
fer to live in an incomplete markets economy when τ =0 .52 and ¯ d = 0 rather than in an
environment with the same tax rate and strictly positive public debt.24. With respect to
inequality indexes, both income and wealth Gini remain relatively constant, whereas the cor-
relation across generations for income slightly increases (ﬁgure 11). Furthermore, coeﬃcient
of variation of total consumption also increases. By applying our welfare gains decomposi-
tion from Proposition 1 to the present experiment, there is evidence that all components are
24See ﬁgure 10 for the values of λ that solve equation (18) when our benchmark economy is the one with
incomplete markets with τ =0 .52 instead of τ = 0. Negative values suggest that an agent prefer to live
with no public debt at all when tax rate is set to its “optimal” redistributive level.
24less than 1 and decreasing in
¯ d
GDP, implying there is no role for public debt when τ =0 .52
- ﬁgure 12 shows the decomposition.25
7R o b u s t n e s s A n a l y s i s
Our robustness check consists in endogenizing labor supply in the model. In particular, we
consider the case where young and old agents choose the amount (in the intensive margin) of
eﬀort they do and derive disutility from working. Momentary utility function has the form











(i = y,o), (43)
where li stands for labor supply.
Although (43) implies that labor supply choice is independent of the consumption-savings,
it is by no means obvious how our results up to this point would change. Most of previous
results relied upon the fact that, in incomplete markets without government, there was an
overaccumulation of both human and physical capital, giving rise to an ineﬃcient allocation
of resources. When we allow for an endogenous labor supply, to overaccumulate human
capital decreases utility, because labor supply of the young will be a positive function of wπ.
Indeed, investment in human capital measured by m rises by the same rate as in section 4
with respect to the eﬃcient equilibrium, and investment in child-care increases only 1.5%,
contrasting with the rise of 50% when labor supply is exogenous.26
The transition path along the lines described in section 4.2, equation (22), is also com-
puted. We ﬁnd that the welfare gains from completing the missing markets are still sub-
stantial - λtr = −0.62 - but lower than before. This is indeed the case because now, as labor
supply exhibits a boom in the beginning of transition path, the agent enjoys a lower level of
consumption net of disutility of working than he would do otherwise with exogenous labor
supply.27
25An analogous result holds if we vary ¯ d when τ =0 .
26See the Addendum (Nascimento, 2004) for a detailed presentation of the new framework, results and
calculations.
27All the computations of welfare gains are done in terms of levels of consumption net of disutility of
working (c − g(l)). This is not a distinct feature here: see, for example, Gomes et al. (2001) for a similar
procedure in a heterogenous agents framework with both agreggate and idiosyncratic shocks.
25T h ee x e r c i s eo fv a r y i n gτ is carried out and the ﬁndings are that λ(τ), again our utilitar-
ian measure of welfare, is maximized at τ = τ∗ =0 .55, and λ(τ∗) = 98%, still representing
substantial gains. With respect to welfare decomposition (Proposition 1), the driving force
for increased levels of welfare is the reduced inequality. However, the eﬀects of reduced uncer-
tainty are not negligible and represent gains of 3.2% of consumption when τ is around 25%.
The redistributive taxation scheme also reduces inequality indexes and ineﬃciency associ-
ated with misinvestment in human capital, and at the same time ameliorates consumption
smoothing (see table 4).
Lastly, when we insert public debt in the model, there are no gains from doing so: welfare
measures decrease holding τ ﬁxed at τ∗ or τ = 0. For example, if government runs a debt
to GDP ratio of 18%, overall welfare is cut by half when τ = 55%. Therefore, the analysis
of redistributive policy carried out in previous sections seems to be quite robust to the
speciﬁcation of preferences.
8 The Other Way Round
In this section we ask the following question: if we assume that Brazil and US have the
same production function of human capital and the same stochastic process for abilities,
but diﬀer with respect to the goods production technology and depreciation rate of capital,
what is the degree of distortion introduced by the government that generates Brazilian-like
inequality statistics? In order to assess this question, we assume the model as in section 2
and that government taxes people’s labor income by a ﬂat-tax rate τ as before, but returns
the proceeds through lump-sum transfers only to the top 10% richer individuals in terms of
labor income arising in incomplete markets without public sector (τ =0 ) .
The results are displayed in table 5. Although wealth Gini increases substantially when
we vary τ, this is not the case with income Gini, which attains a maximum of 0.47 at τ =0 .6,
far below Brazilian income Gini (0.6). With respect to the correlation of labor income across
generations, the model replicates data for τ between 0.4a n d0 .6.
One may infer from the above results that the model is ﬂawed if our task is to replicate
Brazilian inequality indexes. However, since government policies are actually much more
complex, this is not necessarily true: false assumptions frequently account for erroneous
inferences. Therefore, a better and accurate understanding of the distortions caused by
26Brazilian public policies is crucial to appraise the implications of our model, and it is a topic
of further research.
9 Concluding Remarks
This study was concerned with investment in human capital of people early in life and the
ineﬃciencies associated with an incomplete markets economy. Our artiﬁcial economy with
government was calibrated to Brazilian data and its numerical simulations showed that a
uniform taxation scheme alleviate those ineﬃciencies with an income tax of 52%. How the
mechanism works is a straightforward question: it creates a disincentive for the rich to invest
in low ability children, increasing eﬃciency and providing a welfare-improving redistributive
eﬀect. Moreover, it also provides a constant insurance for the young (χ, the lump-sum
transfer), thereby making them less willing to accumulate capital, increasing interest rate
and lowering the costs associated with accumulating assets when the interest rate falls below
the one implied by time preference.
By performing a decomposition of the welfare measure, it was found that reducing in-
equality is the most important factor explaining the preference of the typical agent for an
incomplete markets economy with income tax of 52%. Furthermore, extending the model
so as to allow for public debt, if we keep τ =0 .52 and let the public debt to GDP level to
vary, we conclude there is no role for public debt as long as the welfare gains from ¯ d>0a r e
negative.
Evidently, our proposal of a uniform taxation scheme is not derived optimally like a
optimal mechanism design, but it displayed desirable outcomes as we have already mentioned.
The model also does not permit us to investigate other problems which are particularly
relevant in developing countries such as Brazil. One possible extension of the model would be
to allow for an employment choice, since the question of high unemployment rates in Brazil is
of great concern at the present time. Furthermore, it is not less important to understand the
mechanics which links public debt, welfare, inequality and eﬃciency in developing nations,
whose government’s budget is frequently unbalanced and a nationwide pledge for more equity
in terms of opportunities is often made as it can be inferred, for instance, from Brazil’s last
presidential election. In this sense, we intend to vary both tax rates and debt to GDP levels
together so as to address such question in ulterior research.
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Table 1
Parameter Value Source or Target




20 interest rate ∼ = 9%
µ 2 Cunha and Ferreira (2001)




δ 0.74 Val and Ferreira (2001)
Ability and Productivity
















Data∗ 0.62 4 2 7 .4
Model
(incomplete markets with τ =0 )




Statistics Complete Incomplete Markets Incomplete Markets
Markets with τ =0 w i t hτ =0 .52
Gini of Inc. - 0.61 0.53
Gini of Lab. Inc. 0.70 0.64 0.64
Gini of Wealth - 0.64 0.38
Coeﬀ.o fV a r .o fC o n s . - 2 . 0 1 1 . 0 2
corr(loga,loga−1) 0.70 0.70 0.70
corr(logwπ,logwπ−1) 0.68 0.79 0.75







Skilled Agents 60% 75% 53%
Constrained - 76% 88%
Table 4
Statistics - Endogenous Labor Supply
Statistics Complete Incomplete Markets Incomplete Markets
Markets with τ =0 w i t hτ =0 .55
Gini of Inc. - 0.61 0.48
Gini of Wealth - 0.67 0.25
Coeﬀ.o fV a r .o fC o n s . - 2 . 0 9 0 . 8 4
corr(logwπ,logwπ−1) 0.63 0.80 0.78
corr(loginc,loginc−1) - 0.90 0.84
Skilled Agents 43% 56% 30%
33Table 5
Statistics as a Function of Tax Rate
Statistics τ =0 τ =0 .1 τ =0 .2 τ =0 .4 τ =0 .6 τ =0 .7
Gini of Inc. 0.38 0.41 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.43
Gini of Wealth 0.41 0.50 0.57 0.68 0.77 0.73
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[(1 + λ)1−µ − 1], which, together with (B1) and





[(1 + λ)1−µ − 1] = EVτ, whence (18) follows.
C Appendix































u(¯ c(i),¯ c(i))dF(i). (C1)










































Since u(cy,c o0)=U(cy)+βU(co0)a n dU1 > 0, the above equation implies:
(1 − punc)C = ¯ C. (C2)
Using (C2) and (C1):
u
µ
(1 − pine)(1 − punc)
C
2






u(¯ c(i),¯ c(i))dF(i). (C3)
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Therefore, (33) follows from (C5), (29), (31) and (32).
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . The steps are analogous to the previous proof. Given the




(1 − pine) ¯ C
¢
+ β(1 − α)
1−µU
¡
(1 − pine) ¯ C
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From (23) and (37),
u((1 − punc)αC,(1 − punc)(1 − α)C)=u
¡
α ¯ C,(1 − α) ¯ C
¢
=⇒ U((1 − punc)C)=U( ¯ C)
=⇒ (1 − punc)C = ¯ C. (D2)
Using (D1) and (D2):
U ((1 − pine)(1 − punc)αC)=
Z
U(α¯ c(i))dF(i), or
U ((1 − pine)(1 − punc)(1 − α)C)=
Z
U((1 − α)¯ c(i))dF(i). (D3)
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Therefore, (39) follows from (D5), (29), (31) and (32).
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We carry out a robustness analysis of the results derived in a previous paper by
adding labor supply decision to the general set-up. It is shown that the basic results do
not change signiﬁcantly. But, in addition, by choosing an optimal redistributive income
tax rate, the correlation between labor supply and ability from eﬃcient equilibrium is
restored, implying that through a simple taxation scheme government is able to improve
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11 Expanded Framework
The model builds on the general framework proposed by Aiyagari et al. (2002). Economy’s
structure is a standard overlapping-generations model with one-sided altruism where agents
live for three periods. Each person lives as a child, a young adult (y) and an old adult (o).
At each point in time, the three generations are living together and the mass of young and
old agents is each one normalized to 1.
Choice set-up is as follows. When a child, an agent does not make any choice: he is merely
apt to receive investment in his human capital. There are two channels to increase the human
capital of a child: direct investment of physical resources, labeled m, and spending labor
resources in child-care, n. Investment via m implies in a ﬁxed cost φ. We assume the existence
of a competitive market for providing child-care resources. Young and old agents have both
o n eu n i to ft i m ea n dc h o o s et h ei n t e n s i t yo ft h e i rl a b o rs u p p l y ,ly and lo0 respectively. A
young individual’s remaining choices are standard: how much to consume, to save and to
invest (if any investment is made at all) in his oﬀspring. Lastly, an old agent chooses his
level of consumption and bequests to be inherited by his son.
There is only one good in this economy (o), whose production obeys a neoclassical pro-
duction function: o = O(k,l), where k is the aggregate level of capital and l represents total
labor supply in eﬃcient units, O is strictly increasing in its arguments and strictly concave.
A young agent’s total labor supply, πly,w h e r eπ stands for his productivity, is between
goods production and child-care, that is, every person chooses whether to be a “hard” worker
or a “baby-sitter”. The productivity of labor oﬀered by the young is a predetermined variable
in the following sense: π = H(a−1,m −1,n −1), where a stands for the young’s ability and the
subscript in a−1 reﬂects the fact that the son’s ability is known to his father. If π0 stands
for productivity next period, the function H is said to satisfy: (i) H(a,0,0) = a ≤ π0; (ii)
H(a,m,0) = H(a,0,n)=a; (iii) Hi > 0, i =1 ,2,3; (iv) H12, H13 and H23 > 0; (v) H is
strictly concave in its arguments, jointly and separately. It is also assumed that an agent
with productivity π and ability a−1 working in the child-care sector supplies in eﬃcient units
only a−1ly whatever is his actual productivity level. This fact, jointly with (i), implies the
existence of comparative advantage for skilled agents (m,n > 0) over unskilled (n and/or
m = 0) on working in the production of goods. An old agent’s productivity is assumed to
be independent of his human capital and normalized to 1, and his total labor supply, lo0,i s
2also between goods production and child-care.1 Notice that, because old agents do not have
comparative advantage on working in any sector, they are indiﬀerent to any “specialization”
given the assumption of competitive markets for child-care.2
I nt h i se c o n o m y ,i tm u s tb en o t i c e dt h a ta g e n ts are heterogenous at least in one sense:
they do not have the same level of ability. To this kind of heterogeneity it is given a well-
behaved dynamic structure: we assume that (at)t follows a stationary Markov process with
transition function A1(a|a−1).
Finally, capital accumulation and resources constraints are given, respectively, by k0 =
(1−δ)k+i and ¯ c+m+i = o.H e r e ,δ is the geometric depreciation rate, assumed constant; ¯ c
and i stand as usual for aggregate consumption and physical investment; m is the aggregate
level of investment in human capital through m, and takes into account the ﬁxed cost φ.
1.1 Eﬃcient Allocation
How does an eﬃcient allocation look like in this environment? Possible sources of ineﬃciency
are certainly the idiosyncratic shocks, against which every agent would like to insure himself,
and liquidity constraints, in the sense of non-negative bequests and total wealth. In complete
markets, these problems are ruled out by deﬁnition, and we assume they are for a moment.
Our analysis of labor supply relies on the intensive margin only. The disutility of sup-
plying l units will be given by g(l), where g0,g00 > 0a n dg(0) = g0(0) = 0. Momentary
utility function is ˜ U(¯ c,l)=U(¯ c−g(l)) = U(c) as introduced by Greenwood, Hercowitz and









where µ>1i st h ec o e ﬃcient of relative risk aversion and ˜ θ>0 is the inverse labor supply
elasticity. Given that each young parent also derives utility from his son’s lifetime expected
1This independence hypothesis can be ruled out straigthforwardly, but doing so would complicate a little
the formulation of incomplete markets consumer’s problem. As a topic of further research we intend to
permit an old agent’s productivity to be given by (1 + ψ)π,w h e r eψ>0, in line with theoretical studies
such as Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2003).
2The results do not change if we assume that only young agents work in the child-care sector.
3utility (V 0), his objective function is: U(cy)+βE[U(co0)+θV 0], where β ∈ (0,1) is a in-
tertemporal discount factor and θ ∈ (0,1] represents the degree of altruism towards his son.
The dynamic programming problem facing a young agent living in a world with complete
markets is:
















































1, if π0 >a
0, otherwise
, s(a0|a)i sc o n t i n g e n tc l a i mt ot h ea m o u n ts in case of
occurring state a0 next period given the current ability state a, q(a0|a) represents its price, b
is the bequest received by the old from his parent, and b0 denotes the amount of resources
(or debts) the old leaves to his son.
Given the utility speciﬁcation in (1) and (2), it is easily checked that labor supply is









˜ θ . (3)
Hence, (CP1) can be rewritten in terms of individual consumption net of disutility of working:








































4If we assume an actuarially fair price for the contingent claims, q(a0|a)=
A1
1+r and a
perfect-pooled steady-state (Lucas, 1982)3,t h e nﬁrst-order necessary conditions, jointly with
Benveniste-Scheinkman and envelope theorems, imply (see Appendix A):





y)=( 1 + r)βU1(c
o0)( 5 )
1+r = wH2(a,m,n)l
y,w h e nm>0( 6 )
1+r = H3(a,m,n)l
y,w h e nn>0( 7 )






,f o rm,n > 0( 8 )






,f o rm,n =0 , ( 9 )
where π0 = H(a,m,n) >a .
When θ = 1 (pure altruism), equation (4) yields 1 + r = 1
β, the standard result for the
neoclassical growth model; (5) is a usual Euler equation for a simple two-period economy.
(6) and (7) stand for the non-arbitrage conditions which an equilibrium allocation must
obey. The derivation of equations (8) and (9) are not straightforward, but their economic
interpretation is very simple. Initially notice that a typical agent in our economy will invest
in the human capital of his children only if m and n are both strictly greater than zero: it
will never be the case of m =0a n dn>0, or n =0a n dm>0. This occurs because, for
example, H(a,0,n)=a = H(a,0,0): since the same outcome in terms of future productivity
of the oﬀspring would be achieved if no investment is made at all, to make no investment
will aﬀord the father to consume more presently. But when are m,n > 0? Investment in
children is occurs only if the current costs of becoming skilled (wn+m+φ)f a l l sb e l o wt h e





1+r ). As long as there are two forms to invest in the
human capital of the oﬀspring to enhance their skills, an eﬃciency condition always holds in
this case:
wH2(a,m,n)=H3(a,m,n). (10)
There is a distinguishing feature displayed by the eﬃcient allocation: (8) and (9) imply
decision rules M(a)a n dN(a)a sw e l la sat h r e s h o l d ,a∗, for the level of ability such that
3Every young and every old individual consume the same amount: cy and co0
respectively.
5M(a),N(a) > 0i fa>a ∗ and M(a),N(a) = 0 otherwise. As we shall stress later on,
this condition is not necessarily valid in an incomplete markets environment, giving rise to
misinvestment.
An eﬃcient allocation in a stationary equilibrium is therefore described by equations (4)
to (9), standard proﬁt maximization conditions for a competitive ﬁrm,
r + δ = O1(k,l)( 1 1 )


















¯ c + i+
Z
S
[M(a)+φ]dA(a) ≤ O(k,l), (15)
where S = {a : H(a,M(a),N(a)) >a } is the set of skilled agents in steady-state, U = S c and
A(a) is the stationary distribution associated with the Markov process for ability. Condition
(13) is the total labor supply for goods production and (14) represents market-clearing in
chid-care market.
1.2 Incomplete Markets Structure
Suppose now that bequests are required to be non-negative and there is no private insurance
market, so that we have an incomplete markets structure. Assume in addition there is a
government which taxes people’s labor income uniformly by a tax rate τ ≥ 0 and returns
the proceeds via identical lump-sum transfers (χ)t oy o u n ga g e n t s .I ti sa l s oa s s u m e dt h a t
the budget constraint of government does not need to be balanced every period and it may
run a public debt (dt). Let xt denote total taxes revenue and dt be the amount of debt in
period t; the government budget equation is given by
dt+1 =( 1+r)(dt + χ − xt). (16)
Similarly to Flod´ e n( 2 0 0 1 ) ,w ee x a m i n eo n l yt h ec h o i c eo ft h ea v e r a g el e v e lo fd e b t : ¯ d.
Since labor choices are still independent of consumption-savings decision, the dynamic
6programming problem facing a young agent is:
















y((1 − τ)wπ) − g(l
y((1 − τ)wπ)) + χ
π
0 = H(a,m,n)( C P 3 )
J(π
0,a












o0((1 − τ)w) − g(l
o0((1 − τ)w)) + s + b.
Deﬁnition 1 A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium consists of
(i) Decision rules for ly,l o0,s,m,nand b, respectively ly = ly((1−τ)wπ),l o0 = lo0((1−τ)w),
s = S(π,a,b), m = M(π,a,b), n = N(π,a,b) and b0 = B(π0,a 0,s+b), such that, given
r, w, χ and τ they solve (CP3).























where Ty and To stand for transition functions induced by A(a0|a) and decision rules
in (i).








1+r,a n dl = E(πly)+lo(w) − E(n).











T i m eu n i t yw a ss e tt o2 0y e a r s ,a n dU(c)=c1−µ−1
1−µ .W e p i c k µ = 2, which is contained
in the interval analyzed in Cunha and Ferreira (2003) for Brazil, and βyear =0 .88 = β
1
20
7was selected so that incomplete markets economy without government has an equilibrium
interest rate near 9% observed in Brazil. Only the case of pure altruism is considered: θ =1 .
Labor supply elasticity, 1
˜ θ,w a ss e tt o0 .1, as in Gomes et al. (2001).
Production function has the usual speciﬁcation as for the US economy, except for a lower
TFP: o = O(k,l)=zkνl1−ν,w h e r ez =0 .7a n dν =0 .36. Capital depreciates at a rate of
6.5% each year (Val and Ferreira, 2001), implying δ =1− (1 − 0.065)20 ∼ = 0.74.
The stochastic process driving ability satisﬁes loga0 = ι(1 − ω)+ωloga + σ
√
1 − ω2ζ,
ζ ∼ N(0,1). It is well-known this process is amenable to an approximation by a discrete
Markov process, which will be useful in simulations. Productivity function is H(a,m,n)=
ηaχ[ξnε+(1−ξ)mε]
ρ
ε +a, ε ≤ 1, as in Aiyagari et al. (2002). The ﬁxed cost associated with
m is arbitrarily selected: φ =0 .01. ι, ω, σ, χ, η,ξ, ε and ρ are chosen so that the incomplete
markets economy with τ = 0 replicates income Gini index in Brazil (0.6). A summary of the
calibration procedures in contained in Table 1.
3 Results
3.1 Incomplete Markets without government
Income Gini is 0.61, which is in line with recent empirical evidence in Brazil (Menezes-Filho,
2001), and interest rate is 7.7%. In eﬃcient markets, there is a threshold level of ability,
a∗ =2 .71, such that every agent becomes skilled if his ability is strictly higher than a∗ and
remains unskilled otherwise. In an incomplete markets structure, 39% of agents with ability
below 2.71 become skilled, characterizing a misinvestment phenomenon.
There is also an overinvestment phenomenon, in both human and physical capital, in
incomplete markets, because agents are subject to idiosyncratic shocks and insurance markets
are missing, and it is well-known, since at least Aiyagari (1994), that such setting gives rise
to a overaccumulation behavior. Physical capital stock is 355% higher, investment in human
capital measured by m rises 35% and investment in child-care (wn)i n c r e a s e s1 .5%. The
fraction of skilled agents consequently increases to 56% (as opposed to 43% in eﬃcient
markets).
In the set-up developed here, one may evaluate the “quality” of labor force by looking
at the correlation between ability and labor supply. In complete markets, the correlation is
0.79; it decreases to 0.7 in incomplete markets. See tables 2 and 3 for a summary of the
8statistics presented in text and more.
Average consumption net of disutility of working is 44% higher in incomplete markets,
and steady-state production is 48% higher at the same time. Therefore, agents are better
oﬀ in terms of utility. However, when we perform a transition from incomplete to complete
markets, we ﬁnd that a typical would prefer to live in the last world (λtr = −0.62).4
3.2 Incomplete Markets with government
Suppose ﬁrst there is no public debt and the government taxes agent’s labor income. Solving
(CP3) for τ ∈ [0,1], we found τ(λ) to be a concave function which is maximized at τ∗ =0 .55.5
At this tax level, standard inequality indexes are reduced. For example, income Gini is 22%
and correlation of (log) income across generations decreases from 0.90 to 0.84. Moreover,
consumption smoothing is more eﬃcient: coeﬃcient of variation of consumption is 60%
lower.6 If the correlation between labor supply and ability is a good proxy of the quality of
l a b o rs u p p l y ,i tm u s tb en o t i c e dt h a ts u c hd i m e n s i o ni sr e s t o r e dw h e ng o v e r n m e n ti m p o s e s
an optimal tax: it is now 0.78, contrasting with 0.79 in eﬃcient markets.
With respect to eﬃcient investment in children, now 5% of agents with ability a ≤ a∗
receive positive amounts of investment in human capital. However, if τ = τ∗ only 60% of
high-ability agents become skilled, contrasting with 80% when τ =0 .
Finally, if we keep tax rate at 0 or 0.55 and let
¯ d
GDP to vary, it is clearly noticed that
welfare is reduced. Figure 3 illustrates the case when τ =0 .55.
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A.1 Complete Markets Stationary Equilibrium
Conditions characterizing eﬃcient steady-state are derived similarly to Aiyagari et al. (2002)
framework with exogenous labor supply. (4) to (7) are straightforward. To ﬁnd (8) and (9),
ﬁrstly notice that, assuming a stationary setting and an actuarially fair price for insurance,
budget constraints in (CP2) yield:
c






















Thus, a young agent cares only about the present value of his income net of disutility of
working, not how it splits between total wages net of disutility of working and bequests. An
innocuous algebra in the right-hand side of (A1) implies it can be rewritten as a function of
w(πly(wπ) − a−1ly(wa−1))−(g(ly(wπ))−g(ly(wa−1)))+ b
1+r, a, w and r. Therefore, omitting














Suppose the young agent solves its maximization problem subject to the constraint m,n >
0. To provide his oﬀspring an extra premium in terms of labor income net of disutility of
working, w(π0ly(wπ0) − aly(wa))−(g(ly(wπ0)), costs him m+φ+wn today. Given the form




















(w(π0ly(wπ0) − aly(wa)) − (g(ly(wπ0)) − g(ly(wa))))
1+r
in terms of current resources. Hence, it is true that, in order to skill the child, the costs
associated with investment in human capital must fall below the costs of leaving the labor
income premium in bequests, that is: m + φ + wn <
(w(π0ly(wπ0)−aly(wa))−(g(ly(wπ0))−g(ly(wa))))
1+r .
11A.2 Transitional Dynamics Algorithm
Suppose that, given k0 and Π0 (productivity stationary distribution in incomplete markets),




t=1 such that complete markets steady-state is reached at T +1s u ﬃciently large. The
algorithm consists of the following steps:







implying a guess for wages, (w0
t)T
t=1, according to (12).
2nd)A tt =0 ,k0 and Π0 are the givens. Given w0
1, m0
1 and k0
2 solve for a∗






















where π0 = H(a∗
0,M 0(a∗
0),N 0(a∗



















0)) = (1 + r0)w0, (A5)
and
∙


























Notice that l0 =
R
ly(w0π0)dΠ0 + lo(w0) −
R
N0(a)dA. Equations (A3) to (A5) are
derived from ﬁrst-order conditions in complete markets (section 2.1). It can be shown
that (20) holds using (4), (5) and the perfectly-pooled equilibrium hypothesis.
In order to solve the above system, make an initial guess for l0 and k1,a n dt h e ns o l v e
for a∗
0, M0(·)a n dN0(·) using (A3) to (A5). Compute a revised guess for l0 and k1
using l0 =
R
ly(w0π0)dΠ0 + lo(w0) −
R
Nnew
0 (a)dA and (20). Iterate until convergence
is achieved in a∗
0, M0(·), N0(·), l0 and k1.
123rd)G i v e nk1 and Π0 previously found, conduct a similar procedure as in 2nd)a n ds o l v e
for a∗
1, M1(·), N1(·), l1 and k2 given w0
2, m0
2 and k0
3. Travel down the entire path this






t=1 given by the solution in
each period.










whether child-care market clearing condition, (14), holds along the equilibrium path.
BA p p e n d i x
Table 1
Parameter Value Source or Target




20 interest rate ∼ = 9%
µ 2 Cunha and Ferreira (2001)
θ 1 pure altruism




δ 0.74 Val and Ferreira (2001)
Ability and Productivity
















Data∗ 0.62 4 2 7 .4
Model
(incomplete markets with τ =0 )




Statistics Complete Incomplete Markets Incomplete Markets
Markets with τ =0 w i t hτ =0 .55
Gini of Inc. - 0.61 0.48
Gini of Lab. Inc. 0.69 0.62 0.64
Gini of Wealth - 0.67 0.25
Coeﬀ.o fV a r .o fC o n s . - 2 . 0 9 0 . 8 4
corr(loga,loga−1) 0.70 0.70 0.70
corr(loglab.inc.,loglab.inc.−1) 0.63 0.80 0.78
corr(loginc,loginc−1) - 0.90 0.84







Skilled Agents 43% 56% 30%
Constrained - 53% 94%
14Figure 1
Figure 2
15Figure 3
16